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Abstract 
Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological 
development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. 
First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on 
previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, 
conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the 
possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused 
excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of methodological 
recommendations were determined: 1) a better focusing of the subject’s attention to their mental 
processes, 2) providing suitable stimuli, and 3) the sharing of introspective experience between 
subjects. Furthermore, the potential of adjustments in introspective research designs for 
eliminating attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error is discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Introspection is a key tool for approaching one’s private mental events. The main advantage 
of first-person observation is that it enables direct access to one’s mental life in comparison to 
external observations of one’s behaviors. There are many areas where the methods of 
introspection have been successfully applied so far. Participating as both observer and subject 
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within one’s own psychological experiment enhances the ability to be reflexive about the 
given experiment, and improves the mental models of the phenomena under investigation 
(Corti, Reddy, Choi, & Gillespie, 2015). Furthermore, systematic introspection helps illuminate 
the recollection process in memory research, because it enables one to recall and assemble 
conscious mental fragments from a diffuse background into coherent mental images (Weger, 
Wagemann, & Meyer, 2018a). 
Last, but not least, the methods of introspection are also very helpful for the scientific work 
itself. Systematic first-person observation enables the generation of novel hypotheses, the 
illumination of knowledge representation, and systematic and immanent theory building 
(Weger, Wagemann, & Meyer, 2018b). In emerging scientific fields and theoretical debates, 
systematic introspective self-observation may bring clarity to the positions that researchers take 
and stimulate research-guiding insights (Weger & Wagemann, 2015).  
In recent decades, methods of introspection have been subjected to criticism  (see section 
“Criticism of Introspection”). Some of the critical comments have been constructive, 
immediately calling for new methodological development in the field. However, the critical 
arguments relating to the methods of introspection are dispersed across different studies, and 
no coherent classification of biases that may occur during introspection is presently available. 
Elimination of various biases is of significant importance in the field of introspective methods. 
It may help refine the ways that allow for a clearer understanding of inner experience and 
contribute to a better intersubjective consensus in the psychological discourse. Also, Weger et 
al. (2018b) explicitly point out that a methodological cultivation is needed in the field of 
introspective methods. Therefore, the present study has two main goals. First, to summarize the 
critical arguments and to develop a general classification of biases relating to the methods of 
introspection. Second, to provide methodological recommendations for the possible elimination 
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of bias that may occur during introspection. Finally, to discuss possible avenues for future 
research and theory development. 
 
2. Methods of introspection  
 
2.1 Philosophical roots of introspection 
 
Introspection is the method focused on the investigation of one’s own actual mental states 
or processes by shifting attention to them. In other words, introspection is “regarded as a process 
by means of which we learn about our own currently ongoing, or very recently past, mental 
states or processes” (Schwitzgebel, 2014). The word itself is derived from the Latin intra (into) 
and spectrare (to look). The engagement with one’s internal flow of ideas and images has a 
long tradition, often standing at the heart of philosophical inquiry (Gantt & Thayne, 2013). 
Philosophy, traditionally conceived as the love of wisdom, was fundamentally aimed at 
“knowing thyself”, and thus the process of introspection was considered as very helpful in this 
quest. 
Many philosophical positions considering to a greater or lesser degree the introspective 
access to one’s own actual mental processes have emerged during the past centuries. To provide 
a comprehensive overview of all philosophical perspectives focused on introspection is far 
beyond the scope of the present study (but see, e.g. Schwitzgebel, 2014). Therefore, the 
following outline is selective and primarily aimed to introduce some of Brentano’s and 
Husserl’s thought that was influential for the later development of recent methods of 
introspection. 
Brentano was one of the first who considered mental phenomena as something genuine and 
independent of the physical realm, that is influenced by a deterministic causality. He argues 
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that the consciousness of something occurs together with the subjective awareness of one’s 
mental act (Brentano, 1995). By accepting this, his thought had important consequences for the 
possibility of considering introspective reporting as a valid research tool. Brentano’s 
contribution to the later utilization of first-person methods in psychology is very significant, as 
Brentano conceptualizes the introspective experience on a psychological basis, i.e. as an 
intentional act independent of any intersubjective agreement (Brentano, 1995). According to 
this position, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of the psyche (inner life), the mere faculty of 
being directed toward "some objects or states". 
The dualistic position of Brentano helps him defend the autonomy of  mental phenomena. 
Mental phenomena are considered to be distinct from physical phenomena, and are thus 
available for scientific scrutiny. Brentano’s position avoided the risk of monistic indifference, 
and supported the validity of first-person reporting, i.e. the meaningfulness of the first-person 
description of one’s own mental processes, in scientific research. Physical phenomena are 
suggested to exist only through the evidence of the mental phenomena that correspond to the 
physical ones. 
The dichotomy between mental and physical phenomena was later criticized by Husserl. 
According to Husserl (1970), Brentano’s thought remains dualistic and bound to the prejudices 
of the naturalistic tradition. Husserl (1977) seeks to ground knowledge on a more profound 
(non-dualistic) and universal basis. He does so by justifying the existence of the universal 
essences of things. Such hypothesized essences are neither abstract nor psychologically 
"certain", as in Brentano’s case.  The hypothesized essences may represent points of reference 
or suitable anchors on the path of introspecting our inner life. This way, Husserl tries to avoid 
the rather particular and exclusively psychological consequences of Brentano’s approach. He 
believes that an intersubjective agreement can, indeed, be reached, and also that introspection 
relies on learning. 
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Husserl (1977) was also not satisfied with the way in which Kant (1999) explained "the way 
we are conscious of phenomena", since it entails the division of the world between things-in-
themselves and appearances. Things-in-themselves are meant to be essences or ideals of the 
things we experience; appearances are considered the actual phenomena we experience (Kant, 
1999). Husserl (1983) attempts to overcome the dichotomy between them. The thing-in-itself 
and phenomenon are intertwined, and the interaction between them can be captured through the 
method of “bracketing”, i.e. looking at things from a distance. In doing so, we can capture 
subjective experience without necessarily imposing its “worldly” objective counterpart, and are 
thus free from the prejudices this “objective world” entails. Husserl (1983) makes room for 
unique introspective and actual experience, purified of all kinds of biases. To do so, one has to 
learn “to see” without presuppositions. Husserl (1983) understands this way of self-observation, 
which does not adhere either to the objective world or to the subject-idealist experience, as the 
phenomenal. 
As for introspection, Gutland (2018) assesses Husserl’s contribution in the following 
way: “This is relevant for introspection insofar as there is a crucial distinction between what 
is happening in consciousness and what we notice about it. The Husserlian epoché is a means 
of becoming aware of conscious processes that usually go by unnoticed. Therefore, if you 
practice epoché, it is not that you genuinely create the aspects of consciousness you become 
aware of, but rather you shift your attention toward them.” (p. 5). Recently, Weger, Meyer, and 
Wegemman (2016) hold that consciousness is defined as a flow of mental contents independent 
of human will, but awareness is considered to be a major device of introspection. Via 
introspection, we shift our attention to selected features of consciousness. Weger et al. (2016) 
propose that the method of introspection should be described as clearly as possible in order to 
make first-person research fully transparent. 
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2.2 Introspection and self-awareness 
 
Accessing one’s own mental states in introspective research is closely related to the process 
of self-awareness. Self-awareness refers to a subject’s capacity to become the object of their 
own attention (Morin, 2006). A long tradition of first-person experience, going back to Hume, 
indicates that a subject can attend to their mental states, mental processes, mental contents, etc., 
although it cannot find an inner subject of experience, e.g. an inner subjective entity (Peacocke, 
2014). Self-awareness occurs when one’s attention focuses consciously on the internal milieu. 
In phenomenological terms, it is a process of becoming aware or noticing what one experiences 
(Ziegler & Weger, 2018b). Self-awareness is thus considered a second-order state either in the 
domain of experience or in the domain of thought (Werning, 2010). 
Through self-awareness, a subject may acquire either conceptual or perceptual self-
information. This distinction may not always be sharp in different instances of mental processes 
(Werning, 2010), but generally, perceptual self-information refers to mental contents that 
emerge in relation to and are closely interconnected with sensory inputs, i.e. what a subject 
perceives through the basic human sensory organs, that is, through sight, sound, taste, smell, 
and touch. In contrast, conceptual self-information is suggested to be related to a greater extent 
to one’s externally non-observable events and characteristics such as emotions, physiological 
sensations, values, goals, motives, etc. Morin (2006) uses the term private self-information to 
capture this realm of processes (Figure 1). Interestingly, some emotions are expected to have 
both conceptual and perceptual aspects (Werning, 2010). Aside from private self-information, 
there is also self-related information involving family, work, health, and future (Figure 1). 
Several features of the quality of self-awareness and introspective access can be observed. 
Morin (2006) distinguishes the frequency of self-observation (the time spent by observing the 
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self), the amount (or accessibility) of self-related information, and the accuracy of self-
knowledge.  
Questienne, van Dijck, and Gevers (2018) distinguish three qualitative characteristics of 
introspective reports: sensitivity, specificity, and validity. Sensitivity refers to a subject’s ability 
to introspectively report subtle modulations of experience, e.g. in the case of experiment of 
Questienne, van Dijck, and Gevers (2018), the ability to introspectively report the subjective 
experience of response conflict when the participants were asked to report a subjective urge to 
make an error in the experimental task involving the recognition of the colors of blue, yellow, 
red, or green rectangles. Furthermore, specificity refers to a subject’s ability to dissociate 
different aspects of inner experience, and validity to the degree with which a subject 
introspectively approaches the inner mental processes. All of these features are important to 
consider when analyzing the results of introspective reporting. 
 
 
 Figure 1. Model of conceptual and perceptual self-information and levels of self-
awareness (Adapted from: Morin, 2006) 
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2.3 Empirical research using introspection 
 
Methods of introspection have been used in both first-person and third-person research. The 
distinction between these two streams of research is founded on the different position of the 
observer in the research design. First-person research uses direct self-observation as a principal 
method (Weger et al., 2018a). During the first-person approach, the subject participates as both 
an observer and a participant within one’s own psychological experiment.  
In contrast, third-person research utilizes an external observer’s point of view. Third-person 
methods, sometimes also called second-person methods (however, the term third-person 
methods will be used further in the text, as it is more widely used), are methods based on 
distanced measurement. Simply put, the subject, e.g. participant of an experiment, is different 
than the observer, e.g. researcher, who observes from a  distanced, third-person perspective. 
Third-person methods can be used for the investigation of, for example, the content of naturally 
occurring inner experience (e.g. Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). The participants are instructed to 
recall and immediately note all the details of their inner experience at randomly selected 
moments during the day. Later, during an interview with an external researcher, the participants 
are asked about the details of their past experience at each sampled moment. 
In the field of first-person research, methods of introspection have been used for the 
investigation of various mental processes, such as imagining a circular object in one’s mind 
(Ziegler & Weger, 2018a), of volitionally controlled perceptual reversals (Wagemann, 
Edelhäuser, & Weger, 2018), of recollection from memory (Weger et al., 2018a), and of mind 
wandering (Weger et al., 2018b). Furthermore, third-person research uses introspection for the 
investigation of the content of inner speech (Morin, Duhnych, & Racy, 2018), of the frequency 
of inner speech (Ren, Wang, & Jarrold, 2016), of the frequency of self-talk (Brinthaupt, Benson, 
Kang, & More, 2015), of the content of naturally occurring inner experience (e.g. Heavey & 
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Hurlburt, 2008), of the awareness of mind-wandering and mind-blanking (Bastian et al., 2017; 
Ward & Wegner, 2013), of the possibility of reporting phenomenal experience (Questienne et 
al., 2018), of experiences during meditation (Przyrembel & Singer, 2018), or of the ex post 
retrieval of the reasons for making a certain decision (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Petitmengin, 
Remillieux, Cahour, & Carter-Thomas, 2013). 
First-person and third-person research using the methods of introspection has a great 
potential for informing each other. There is also a potential area for conducting novel research 
that would combine both methodological approaches.  
 
2.4 Criticism of introspection 
Methods of introspection have been criticized from various positions (for an overview, see 
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001; Peels, 2016; Ramm, 2018). For example, Dennett (2003, 2007) 
claims that the first-person science of consciousness is a discipline with no methods, and 
considers the making of judgments about one’s own experience to be unscientific. A significant 
part of past criticism is quite general, i.e. following the behaviorists’ position by accepting only 
externally detectable, verifiable, and methodologically testable aspects of cognition (see Clegg, 
2013). In other words, the reliability of the cognition of inner experience was considered to be 
limited compared to the cognition of external events. This general criticism served as an 
important starting point for distinguishing the specific errors that may occur during 
introspection (see later subsections). 
Interestingly, some recent scholars also follow this line of criticism. The persistent presence 
of bias is suggested to be present in subjective measures and in all introspective methods (Irvine, 
2012). Subjects are suggested to be incapable of controlling their own self-distorting biases 
(Piccinini, 2010) and only the external experimenter is suggested to validly use a subject’s 
reports as data (Dennett, 2003, 2007). 
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An important source of criticism has crystallized among introspectionists themselves during 
the debate on the nature of “imageless thought” (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001). In contrast to 
sensationalism, i.e. the assumption that thinking without images is impossible (Titchener, 
1980), several German introspectionists suggest that some ideas are not at all of imaginal nature, 
labeling them as “imageless thought“. This controversy related to the basic nature of 
introspection contributes to the skepticism concerning methods of introspection. Recently, 
some third-person empirical studies suggest that non-symbolic thinking may occur when 
investigating naturally occurring inner experience (e.g. Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). 
 
2.4.1 Attentional and conceptual errors 
When searching for more concrete insights into the bias accompanying introspection, Ramm 
(2018) provides a general classification of two errors accompanying introspection, namely 
attentional and conceptual error. Attentional error occurs when the subject fails to notice the 
target experience due to a lack of attention. In contrast, conceptual error occurs when the subject 
makes an incorrect judgment about the target experience because of a failure in possessing, 
forming, or employing the correct concept about the experience (see also Clegg, 2013). For 
example, when a subject experiences a highly complex emotional experience, it may be 
sometimes difficult to access the correct concept about such an experience. Human emotional 
life shows a very high variability. Therefore, some instances of complex emotional experience 
may be relatively new or uncommon for a subject. Under these circumstances, it may be 
problematic for a subject to connect the target experience with the relevant concepts of emotions 
formed during past emotional situations. 
 
 
 
11 
 
2.4.2 Expressional error  
A reliable awareness of inner experiences and its expression in words, i.e. in natural 
language, is sometimes very difficult for subjects to achieve. Already Skinner (1953) identifies 
the verbal difficulties related to reporting inner experience to be one of the limitations of the 
scientific use of first-person methods. The problem with reporting inner experience is that many 
of our inner experiences have the character of non-symbolic thinking, i.e. they are the 
experience of thinking without words or other symbols (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Werning 
(2010) suggests that not all mental processes are easily accessible through introspective 
reporting, or can be properly expressed by natural language. Only mental processes that have a 
phonological or quasi-phonological structure, e.g. a sub-symbolically structured inner speech, 
are suggested to be available for reliable introspective reporting (Werning, 2010). However, the 
targeting of the researchers’ attention to inner speech also cannot ensure the optimal reliability 
of introspective reporting. Knappik (2017) points out that inner speech is normally highly 
fragmentary and condensed, and that it is problematic for subjects to express the stream of their 
inner speech in words. 
 
2.4.3 Attributional error 
Third‐person research of memory retrieval has shown that subjects may fail when retrieving 
the causes of their previous behaviors. The reliability of introspective reporting has shown to 
be low when subjects try to retrieve the reasons for their past decisions (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). Indeed, conscious or intentional memory retrieval may be slightly too problematic to be 
considered an introspective process, because, according to Schwitzgebel´s definition (2014), 
introspection is suggested to be a judgment about one’s current or very recent conscious 
experiences. However, we mention the instance of attributional error here to provide the reader 
with a comprehensive outline. 
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Previous research showed that introspective memory retrieval can easily be influenced and 
even deceived by the transformation of memory across time (Clegg, 2013) or by external 
psychological manipulation (Weger & Wagemann, 2015). Jopling (2011) also points out the 
difficulty of participants to ascribe reasons to their previous behaviors. During introspective 
memory retrieval, disturbances such as confabulation or rationalization are suggested to occur. 
Despite of the criticism focused on attributional bias during introspective memory retrieval, 
some research shows that attributional error occurs only during some types of mental acts. 
Petitmengin et al. (2013) show that specific mental acts enable good access to the correct 
attribution of the causes of the previous decisions of subjects. Reyes and Sackur (2018) point 
out that the low reliability of introspective memory retrieval may be a by-product of an 
inadequate experimentation context. Generally, attributional error is suggested to occur only in 
the inquiry involving an ex post explanation of previous behaviors. 
In sum, four main errors may occur during introspection: attentional error, attributional 
error, conceptual error, and expressional error (Table 1). This classification will be used in the 
following sections throughout the present study. 
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Table 1. Classification of main errors that may occur during introspection. 
 
Error type 
 
Description 
 
Attentional 
error  
 
 
Subject fails to notice the target experience due to a lack of attention 
 
Attributional 
error  
 
 
Subject fails to explain the causes of their previous behaviors 
 
Conceptual 
error  
 
 
Subject fails to access the particular concept of the target experience 
 
Expressional 
error  
 
 
Subject fails to reliably express the target experience in natural 
language because of the verbal difficulties related to reporting 
subjective experience 
 
 
3. Possible ways of eliminating bias in introspection 
 
In order to discover the possible ways of eliminating the errors mentioned above, the authors 
conducted a search and a focused excerpting of scientific literature related to the methods of 
introspection. The analysis of introspective literature was targeted on finding possible ways of 
eliminating the errors that may occur during introspection. The analysis was not restricted either 
to first-person or to third-person research. Both streams of introspective research were used as 
possible resources of ideas leading to the improvement of the reliability of introspective 
research. The following groups of methodological recommendations were determined: a better 
focusing of the subject’s attention to their mental processes, providing suitable stimuli, and the 
sharing of introspective experience between subjects. These groups were not created using a 
predetermined conceptual framework, but were allowed to emerge from the focused excerpting 
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of scientific literature in the course of analysis. The main insights within each group of 
methodological recommendations are presented in the following sections. 
 
3.1 Focusing of the subject’s attention to mental processes 
 
3.1.1 Motivating the subject to focus attention on their mental processes 
The motivation of the subject to focus attention on their mental processes is considered to 
be essential for the good accessibility to mental processes. Brinthaupt et al. (2015) highlight the 
important role of motivation in recognizing or acknowledging one’s self-talk. It can be assumed 
that subjects who are highly motivated to observe their inner experience report more utterances 
and details about their inner experience.  
The third-person experiment of Zedelius, Broadway, and Schooler (2015) shows that being 
motivated to monitor and catch oneself when their mind is wandering enhances the 
introspective access to spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts. Subjects were motivated by 
incentives such as the opportunity to gain a monetary bonus for accurate reporting or for 
calculating their overall bonus, i.e. to receive a point for each accurate self-report and lose a 
point for each inaccurate self-report of mind wandering. The authors controlled the validity of 
self-reports by the covert behavioral assessment of mind wandering. The results showed that 
motivated subjects showed a higher accuracy in catching themselves if their mind wandered. 
Motivating subjects is thus a good way to enhance attention to subjective mental processes in 
third-person introspective research. In first-person experiments, the subjects under investigation 
are the researchers themselves, so one may expect that they can be motivated by the fact that 
they are doing their own research projects. 
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3.1.2 Training of the subject’s introspective competencies 
The systematic training of introspective competencies has been revealed to be an effective 
way of improving introspection. Weger et al. (2016) demonstrate how such training improves 
first-person access to one’s mental processes. They implemented five exercises based on 
meditative concentration. During 10-15 minute inner observation trials, the subjects 
concentrated on concrete shapes (a triangle) or words. By repeating these exercises, the 
accessibility of inner experience was improved. For example, when concentrating on a triangle, 
subjects achieved better introspective insights into the structural laws of the triangle, despite of 
the fact that the subjects did not observe any concrete physical picture of a triangle. In a similar 
vein, subjects may be trained in various introspective focuses. This kind of training has great 
potential for the elimination of conceptual error in introspection, i.e. when the subject fails to 
properly access the appropriate concept. 
 
3.1.3 Bracketing presuppositions 
The failure of the explanations of the causes of one’s previous behaviors is often related to 
the subjects’ use of generalizations, rationalizations, confabulations, or other kinds of cognitive 
distortions in the ex post attributions of causes (see Khalil, 2017). Jopling (2011) points out that 
subjects often provide readily available generalizations about themselves when they are 
confronted with after-the-fact cause-seeking introspective questions such as “Why did I do 
that?”. These generalizations may be based on culturally-learned and idiosyncratic theories 
about "why I performed behavior X" (Jopling, 2011) or on other cognitive distortions. 
To eliminate this bias in the introspective ex post explanation of a subject’s previous 
behavior is not easy. Some researchers recommend the bracketing of presuppositions or the 
bracketing (suspension) of everyday belief-constructs as a necessity at all levels of introspective 
investigation (e.g. Hurlburt, 2018; Wagemann, Edelhäuser, & Weger, 2018). Despite of the fact 
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that many phenomenological philosophers have used the bracketing of presuppositions with 
success, the question is how to implement the bracketing of presuppositions in introspective 
empirical research in psychology. The bracketing of presuppositions should enable the subject 
to be minimally influenced by their intentions, motives, values, attitudes, and opinions when 
observing their inner processes. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine how to instruct the 
participants to bracket their presuppositions, i.e. to temporarily remove their intentions, 
motives, values, attitudes, and opinions from their consciousness. The development of research 
designs enabling subjects to fully control the influences of intentions, motives, values, attitudes, 
and opinions during introspection is a big challenge for the future methodological developments 
in the field. 
At the same time, Ziegler and Weger (2018b) point out the differences in the effort that 
needs to be exerted in different instances of introspective access. Introspecting sense-
perceptions, e.g. the mental images of geometric concepts, is suggested to be relatively easy in 
comparison to the focused production of conceptual thinking. This type of introspection aims 
to approach the material that is not available to one’s consciousness without one’s active effort 
and involvement. The focused production of conceptual thinking is necessary, for example, 
when approaching conceptual relations, i.e. the relations between lines, points, and circles in 
the case of geometric concepts (Ziegler and Weger, 2018b). 
 
3.2 Providing suitable stimuli 
 
The first-person experiments of the subjective experience of contours show that the 
appearance of contours is significantly shaped by changes in the spatial organization of patterns, 
even in the case when the stimuli shapes are the same (Ramm, 2018). The changes in the spatial 
organization of black pie-shapes elicit an emergent phenomenal character of experience of 
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visual stimuli, i.e. the experience that one sees an illusory triangle. Ramm (2018) points out that 
the appropriate phenomenal concept can be activated or formed by providing suitable stimuli. 
In this case, the suitable stimuli eliminated the likelihood of possible conceptual errors in the 
experimental settings, where no actual closed triangular figures were present in the stimuli and 
the induced experience of a triangle was only illusory.  
Reyes and Sackur (2018) show that more suitable modifications of experimental conditions 
can improve the introspective access to one’s mental content in the case of using identical 
stimuli. Many previous studies use perceptually different stimuli to generate different cognitive 
processes of introspection. However, this negatively influences the participants’ subjective 
reports, which had the character of interpretative, confabulatory reports rather than truly 
introspective reports (Reyes & Sackur, 2018). Through the suitable modification of 
experimental manipulation, the authors suggest that the participants’ reporting approached even 
highly complex cognitive processes, such as decision making. 
Furthermore, Morin (2006) points out that people who are frequently exposed to 
environmental stimuli that remind them of their objective status for others tend to also show 
higher levels of self-awareness when compared to those individuals who are not. This kind of 
stimuli conditions includes, for example, self-focusing stimuli, such as mirrors, audiences, or 
video recordings of the self. The self-focusing stimuli could be utilized in experiments in 
various ways, e.g. as primes, as experimental stimuli that are present during a subject’s 
introspection, or as stimuli for training introspective access before an experiment. Such types 
of stimuli conditions may stimulate higher levels of self-awareness. However, it is questionable 
whether higher levels of self-awareness may also lead to a higher engagement in self-
observation and to deeper introspective insights. 
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3.3 The sharing of introspective experience between subjects 
 
The sharing of experiences between subjects may help increase the validity of introspective 
reporting, since intersubjective consensus can ensure that all subjects are speaking about the 
same thing (Weger & Wagemann, 2015). Telephone conferences, personal meetings, or online 
discussions are considered to be examples of tools that can be used for the intersubjective 
sharing of introspective insights (e.g. Weger et al., 2018b). Such sharing of one’s first-person 
experience is suggested to be able to prevent the unexpected and involuntary biases that may 
arise from different expectations and prejudices (Ziegler & Weger 2018a). The mutual reporting 
of experiences enables the mutual influencing, sharpening, and mirroring of individual self-
observations (Weger, Meyer, & Wagemann, 2016). Intersubjective consensus and sharing are 
suggested to be very helpful for the elimination of expressional errors that may arise from the 
difficulty of reliably expressing the description of mental processes using natural language. 
Sharing inner experiences between subjects can help a subject find the expressions and words 
that can satisfactorily describe the particular inner experience. The experimenters may also 
guide or specifically instruct the subject before an experiment to avoid expressional errors and 
to achieve more reliable introspective reports. Within the quantitative third-person designs, the 
ex post validation of responses across a sample can be conducted as well. Comparing the 
responses of different subjects in order to validate each separate response may eliminate the 
expressional errors of individual subjects, but such comparison cannot help us avoid any errors 
arising from the generalization across the sample as a whole. 
Finally, it is also important to stress that the sharing of experiences between subjects may 
be vulnerable to group biases and errors arising from the post-event consolidation of primary 
introspective reports. To correct and consolidate one’s own first-person description of the inner 
experience also implies that one’s description is being confronted with an outside source of 
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information. Such post-event exposition to new information from a different subject or subjects 
may bias the primary introspective report. This so-called misinformation effect (Pickrell, 
Bernstein, & Loftus, 2012) occurs when a person’s description of past experience becomes less 
accurate because of being later exposed to new information. The new information that a person 
later receives is suggested to work backwards in time, and distorts the primary memory of the 
original event or experience. Therefore, the misinformation effect should be taken into account 
when planning research designs involving the ex post sharing of experiences between subjects. 
 
4. Discussion  
 
The previous criticism has revealed four main errors that may occur during introspection, 
attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. When looking at the essence of 
these errors, all of these errors may occur not only during first-person introspection, but during 
introspection of any kind. This implies that errors reported in previous critical studies are not 
specific to first-person introspective inquiry, but may be expected to occur in all research that 
focuses on the exploration of mental processes. 
 
4.1 Future research and research gaps directly observable from the errors 
 
4.1.1 Elimination of attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional errors 
The present study raises several methodological issues to be discussed. Attentional error 
refers to the instance when a subject fails to notice the target experience because of a lack of 
attention focused on this target experience. The present study brings several methodological 
recommendations for the elimination of attentional error, i.e. focusing the subject’s attention on 
inner mental processes, or providing a stimuli that can enhance the subject’s attention during 
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introspection. Despite of these methodological recommendations, there is a lack of empirical 
evidence, especially in the fields such as the evaluation of the effectiveness of focusing a 
subject’s attention on their mental processes, the comparison of a group stimulated within an 
experiment with the control group of participants, within which there  is no stimulation of a 
subject’s attention towards their mental processes, and the comparison of the impact of various 
stimuli on the quality of a subject’s attention during introspection. 
In contrast, conceptual error denotes a problem in accessing the subject’s concept of the 
target experience. This kind of problem can be considered a threat for reliable introspective 
reporting. If a subject does not access the particular concept of the target experience, their 
introspective reporting may be less reliable. Here, the training of the subject’s introspective 
competencies is one of the most promising ways of improving a subject’s access to conceptual 
knowledge. Previous research has revealed that the systematic training of introspective 
competencies succeeds in improving first-person access to one’s own mental processes (Weger 
et al., 2016). On the other hand, it has not been recently clear how introspective reporting may 
be biased by the specific styles of training introspective competencies. There are various ways 
of training introspective competencies, and the empirical evidence is sparse in this field. 
However, it can be hypothesized that the specific training approaches and procedures may also 
have specific impacts on the first-person access to one’s own mental processes. More research 
comparing different approaches for training introspective competencies is needed in this field. 
Similarly, it is not known how the sharing of introspective experience between subjects may 
be biased by the selection of subjects for the study. Human minds are highly complex systems, 
comprised of various intentions, motives, values, attitudes, and opinions. The sharing of 
introspective experience between subjects in first-person research designs denotes the 
interaction between the minds of a relatively low number of subjects. Therefore, one may ask 
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if and how the results of first-person inquiry may be influenced or biased by the specific patterns 
of intentions, motives, values, attitudes, and opinions. 
When thinking about the sources of expressional error, i.e. the subject’s problematic 
expression of inner processes, two possible sources of this error can be considered. First, the 
problematic expression can be related to the aforementioned problematic access to subject’s 
concept of the target experience. Here, the subject’s problematic access to conceptual 
knowledge may also influence the use of language during introspective reporting. Second, 
problematic verbal expression can be also influenced by the subject’s limited language 
competencies, i.e. not all subjects have the same vocabulary, stylistic competencies, or 
storytelling talent. Despite of good access to concepts about the target experience, the subject 
is not assured they are able to express it reliably in natural language.  
There is no doubt that language competencies influence the quality of introspective 
reporting. The solution could be to select participants with good language competencies or to 
train subjects in improving their language competencies before their participation in the study. 
However, the question is how such training of language competencies should be designed to be 
effective, and, at the same time, not influence introspective reporting inappropriately. One may 
even question if the training of subjects in psychological or philosophical terms and concepts 
is a good method at all. By familiarizing subjects with scientific terminology, introspective 
reporting may become more rich and detailed, but at the same time, it can also become biased 
in terms of influencing the subjects’ language competencies for the purpose of the research 
itself. This effect should be considered when planning future introspective research designs, as 
well as when interpreting the data from introspective studies using professional scientists as 
participants. 
Finally, the present focused excerpting of scientific literature did not reveal any 
methodological recommendations for the elimination of attributional error. Attributional error 
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may occur during introspective memory retrieval of reasons for a subject´s previous decisions 
or behaviors (Clegg, 2013; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Weger & Wagemann, 2015). Future 
research in this field should focus on an in-depth exploration of the process of attributing 
reasons for a subject’s previous decisions or behaviors. This research should also explore the 
alternative possibilities of explanations of a subject’s previous decisions or behaviors, which 
may bring new insights into the selection process of reasons from possibilities as a whole. 
 
4.1.2 Self-absorption and attention during introspection 
Attentional activity is needed when a subject aims to observe their inner mental processes. 
However, the question remains, how does the attentional activity itself influence the 
introspective process? When one tries to introspect on their inner experience, they may feel the 
lack of the cognitive capacity to do so, since their attention may be fully absorbed in a given 
experience (Ziegler & Weger, 2018a). Thinking about what one experiences may thus absorb 
some part of the subject’s attention. One may even speculate that the experience of introspection 
may alter the original experience, because such an effort may elicit a change in the introspective 
process, allowing a kind of experience that did not previously exist to emerge. A possible 
hypothesis that draws from Husserl’s concept of epoché could be that by distancing one’s self 
from experience, one does not alter it, but merely lets it be and stands beside it. 
 
4.1.3 Self-observer effect 
Already Brentano (1995) distinguishes between inner observation and inner perception. 
Inner observation is suggested to involve full attention to one’s mental processes and 
interferes with the process of observing (Schwitzgebel, 2014). In contrast, inner perception 
is suggested not to involve attention to one’s mental processes. 
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More recently, Ziegler and Weger (2018a) mention an important dilemma involving the 
effect of self-observation in itself. They point out that a subject cannot be sure if their experience 
is disturbed by their self-observation or not. Or, in the case that it is, to what extent? A subject 
is an active agent of self-observation during introspection (Brinkmann, 2013). Any observer, 
however, unearths processes that have always been implicitly present. It is true that an observer 
creates a quality formerly not present, but it would be an exaggeration to say that they 
themselves invent it. Current scientific knowledge about the human cognitive capacities for the 
reflexive processing of the effects of self-observation on the quality of introspective reporting 
is limited. Therefore, an investigation of the quality of a subject’s self-awareness of the process 
of self-observation may pose an interesting challenge for future research. 
 
4.1.4 Controlling self-serving bias 
The reliability of self-related information reported in introspective research may be 
influenced by cognitive self-distortions that help subjects protect their self-esteem (Morin, 
2006). Subjects are often engaged in a wide variety of self-serving bias, e.g. self-enhancement, 
self-inflation, and overly positive self-views (Clegg, 2013; Kurt & Paulhus, 2008; Kwan, John, 
Robins, & Kuang, 2008). This self-distorting cognitive bias may elicit attributional, conceptual, 
as well as expressional error in introspective reporting, because subjects tend to report their 
subjective experience unreliably in an effort to protect their self-esteem. The introspective 
reporting of private self-information is then distorted by this bias. Any future research seeking 
the methods of controlling these types of self-serving biases should be aware of the sensitive 
nature of this bias and of the adaptive character of a subject’s need to protect their self-esteem. 
It is also necessary to mention the ethical issues of retrieving self-related information protecting 
self-esteem. One may ask if the retrieval of such material is safe for a subject, and whether it 
could cause any negative mental health outcomes or discomfort for the subject. 
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4.2 Future research and research gaps regarding the wider framework 
 
4.2.1 In-depth exploration of language used during introspective reporting  
Future research should pay increased attention to the language that subjects use for their 
descriptions of inner experiences (see Wagoner, 2013 for further insights). For example, Kross 
et al. (2014) investigate the influence of the language that people use to refer to the self during 
introspection. Interestingly, using non-first-person pronouns and one’s own name enhanced 
self-distancing during introspection (Kross et al., 2014). Self-distancing may generally be 
valued as enhancing the objectivity of research. Despite of the need for objectivity and 
especially for the intersubjective sharing of results, the question remains if and to what extent 
should participants accommodate their language to be more similar to the language that is used 
in psychological theory and research? Is this desirable? Or vice versa, can we expect that 
scientific language should be inspired by the introspective reports of the "naive" participant? 
Should scientific language be influenced by the language used by the participant who is not 
simultaneously in the role of the researcher? These questions underlie the need for the sensitive 
analysis of the language that is used during introspective reporting (compare also narrative 
versus metacognitive introspection in Gould, 2013), and also for future discussions relating to 
the interactions between the language of researchers and the language of participants. 
 
4.2.2 The role of background during introspection 
Any intention of observing one’s inner experience needs a background against which it only 
gains meaning, i.e. preceding thoughts, perceptions, feelings, or imaginations. Every 
determination requires a field of possibilities from which such a determination can be formed. 
Every focusing of attention excludes some of the other possible perspectives, as well as 
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presupposes a number of backgrounds. The act of introspection requires a background from 
which it originates, and we may therefore ask what role does this background play during 
introspection? Or, how may the background influence such introspective reporting? Future 
theoretical development should discuss how the results of introspection are interrelated to the 
background of one’s cognition that is present before and during introspection. 
 
4.2.3 The influence of the interviewer/analyst 
Within third-person introspective inquiry, the interviewer or analyst plays an important role 
for the obtained results. Especially in the case of qualitative interviewing, the interviewer 
always interacts with the participant and this interaction also shapes the subsequent 
development of the interview and of the yielded results. Therefore, the influence of the 
interviewer, as well as the analyst, should be taken into account when evaluating the validity of 
introspective reports in third-person research. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the present study, the past constructive criticism of the methods of introspection has been 
summarized and analyzed. The biases and distortions accompanying introspection are a 
necessary by-product of a subject’s cognition. Considering these critical arguments together 
results in the classification of four main errors that may occur during introspection: attentional, 
attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, the following methodological 
recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined: 1) a better 
focusing of a subject’s attention to their mental processes, 2) providing suitable stimuli, and 3) 
the sharing of introspective experience between subjects. However, we have shown that it is 
not possible to reliably estimate the extent to which the errors that may occur during 
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introspection can be eliminated or regulated. This, in turn, opens new avenues for future 
research, which this paper was able to point out. 
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